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Introduction
The unique nature of governance at the international stage springs 
up numerous debates. Whilst there are often divergent opinions on 
many of the issues raised, one of the few issues for which there appears 
to be some form of consensus is regarding the dire need to subject public 
authority to scrutiny even at the international level. The bane of this 
paper will hence centre on the need for more effective accountability 
especially in International Economic Institutions (IEIs). 
For the purpose of this paper, IEIs are inter-governmental 
organisation (and service providers) dedicated to or engaged in the 
prescription, assessment, operationalization, and enforcement of 
policies and decisions pertaining to economic, trade, and/or financial 
issues. International regimes are indeed distinctly different from 
national regimes especially in terms of robustness of institutional 
authority and constitutional scrutiny. The weakness of the oversight 
mechanism in the former relative to the latter is one of the reasons 
warranting the need to pay special attention to the accountability of IEIs. 
More specifically, the need for a thorough review of IEIs’ accountability 
is further accentuated by the fact that most of the present efforts to 
scrutinise International Institutions (IIs) have been done from narrow 
prisms and through limited benchmarks. 
A noteworthy effort to hold IIs accountability is the meticulous 
scrutiny of the One World Trust, an NGO which produces the Global 
Accountability Report (GAR). Their efforts have indeed been rightly 
commended. The timeliness and value of this effort is aptly expressed 
in the statement of one observer who stated thus:
“Impunity thrives on ignorance. We have entered an age when 
specialists manage the truth in function of organisational interests. 
This authoritative report’s findings on the transparency of NGOs, 
corporations and inter-governmental organisations are disturbing. 
Rating powerful organisations against four ‘accountability capabilities’ 
is a courageous undertaking.”
However, though such bold and useful effort is a right step in 
the right direction, it is also a candid reflection of the dire state 
of governance at the international level. The fact that the GAR is 
considered commendable despite the fact that only 30 organisations 
are reviewed on a rolling basis is of concern. Moreover, the scrutiny 
is limited to three sectors. Indeed, the limited scope of the activities 
of the GAR and the relative lack of accountability of IIs is much 
regretted. This shortcoming has been recognised by one commentator 
who asserted that “[t]ax-payers, consumers and victims of poverty and 
abuse the world-over have a right to such high-quality information 
on the myriad organisations affecting their daily lives.” An even more 
deflating observation is that it appears that the drive towards producing 
the GAR has stalled as the last assessable report was published in 2008.
Indeed, the GCR is commendable. The assessment through 
benchmarks such as transparency, participation, and evaluative 
capacity is ideal and the results generated from such exercise can give a 
good indication of the scrutinised institutions or even an entire sector. 
Its value notwithstanding, the fact remains that the nature of (in) action 
requiring scrutiny extends beyond those covered by these indicators. 
First, assessment of IIs activities via the benchmarks of transparency 
and participation can constrict the scope of scrutiny to procedural 
issues at the expense of equally important substantive issues. For 
example, in the GAR 2008, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) was recognised as the highest scoring 
intergovernmental organisation after assessing its public information 
policy, external stakeholder engagement, membership control amongst 
others. Though these indicators provide quality information on the 
value of EBRD’s governance, they do not give full indication of the 
true value and impact of their policies and operations. The potential 
problem with the ranking therefore is that it obscures concerns that 
might exist in the substantive side of EBRD’s governance.
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Abstract
The need to hold International Institutions (IIs) accountable is well documented. In response to such clamours, 
there has been effort to implement some level of scrutiny of institutional actions either through an internal process or 
through some form of external review. It is contended that efforts so far made are inadequate as; first, the present level 
of scrutiny is often focused on institutional forms and procedures with scant or no visible scrutiny of the substantive 
actions of IIs. Secondly, even if substantive actions were to be scrutinised, many IIs (particularly international economic 
institutions) would escape scrutiny because of the somewhat blanket assumption that their acts are not authoritative. 
This paper seeks to establish the need to hold international institutions accountable for their substantive actions and 
in particular to broaden the scope of scrutiny to include seemingly innocuous “soft” measures through the adoption of 
“effect-perspective” in characterising an institution’s modus operandi.
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Scholars have attempted in some way to bring attention to the 
prevailing accountability issues in IIs through academic evaluations. 
For example, efforts have been made to assess the effect of IMF 
programmes [1]. Nevertheless, scholarly efforts in assessing the 
substance of IIs’ activities remain inadequate for a number of reasons. 
First, scholarly evaluations, though valuable in their own right are 
by no means substitute for an effective and robust transnational 
accountability framework. 
Secondly, scholars have been complacent in their treatment of IEIs 
especially those ones that appear not to engage in obvious governance 
activities. When they provide some level of evaluation, they tend to 
focus on institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), EU 
and so on because of their more visible exercise of authority. Some level 
of attention is also paid to institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank because of the obvious direct impact they could have. However 
much less attention is paid to institutions that appear to merely churn 
out standards or provide information based on the mistaken premise 
that they do not exercise cohesive authority. As though it is not bad 
enough that there does not exist firm accountability framework at 
the international arena, the misconception of great many scholars 
further insulates such overlooked institutions from being subjected to 
substantive scrutiny [2]. 
The aim of this paper is to postulate an accountability mechanism 
that would broaden the scope of scrutiny of IIs beyond the procedural 
issues. The mechanism should recognise and provide the means for 
scrutinising the substantive actions of these IIs. To ensure robustness 
of such mechanism, there need to be a reassessment of the indicators 
that signal the need for scrutiny. 
This paper will be divided into four parts. Part I gives a holistic 
analysis of the imperativeness of IIs accountability. Part II provides a 
re-orientation of the public law perspective to institutional governance. 
This part clarifies the dimension of accountability which this paper 
seeks to strengthen. Part III elaborates in greater detail on the concept 
of substantive accountability which this paper seeks to promote. Part 
IV contains the conclusion.
Accountability of International Institutions
It is essential to hold IIs accountable in order to ascertain their 
credibility and to secure control over public power [3]. As such, to 
assert that an institution has put in place adequate accountability 
mechanism implies that there exists some standard through which 
the conducts of actors are assessed. It also implies that such system 
provides for sanctions [4]. 
Addressed in light of global governance, issues of accountability 
have often been centred on concerns pertaining to institutional 
design, efficiency and effectiveness of the outcomes resulting from 
the institutions under scrutiny. Such accountability mechanism is 
generally less concerned about suitability of goals. Rather, it is more 
focused on how goals are achieved. This form of accountability, herein 
termed ‘procedural accountability’ is quite common and by all means 
relevant in addressing issues of rule of law and due process. 
However, whilst it remains important to assess institutions in 
terms of their compliance with procedural rules, one should in no 
way consider such procedural scrutiny as representing the outer limit 
of an accountability framework. This point is worthy of emphasis as 
it is not uncommon in this increasingly globalised world to take for 
granted substantive convictions underlying institutional acts as being 
universally valid. In other words, because substantive actions of 
institutions is an internal affair requiring specific level of expertise and 
awareness of contexts and circumstances [5], there is the tendency that 
one overlooks the power relations and conflicting values that underlie 
or are associated with them. 
While it is acknowledged that general benchmarks for scrutinising 
the substantive convictions and actions of individual IIs would likely be 
undesirable and impractical, this cannot justify the failure to exercise a 
minimum level of scrutiny. In this regard, Venzke contends that there 
are political and normative implications not only to the manner in 
which IIs achieve their goals but also the goals which they choose to 
pursue. She thus suggests that “[i]n order to increase the legitimacy 
of international institutions, their conception cannot be confined to 
instruments for an effective implementation of agreed-upon goals 
but must equally encompass an arena for debating and contesting 
such goals and for channelling political conflict” [6]. This sentiment 
is shared in this paper and as such, in addition to pursuing procedural 
accountability, this paper will emphasise the need to pursue what is 
herein termed “substantive accountability”. It should be noted that the 
concept of substantive accountability is not to be understood in terms 
of political accountability (i.e., democracy, legitimacy) but more in the 
public law sense. 
Before a proper scrutiny of the substantive contents of institutional 
practices is undertaken, it is imperative that the role of IIs in global 
governance is first established. As it would be shown in greater 
detail, if we are to develop any meaningful account of substantive 
accountability, the role of IIs would have to be understood as distinct 
from other international actors. In other words, they would have to 
be seen as possessing inherent autonomy and authority [6]. Failure to 
properly delineate the characteristics of an authoritative action might 
result in some institutions being unwittingly taken out of the radar of 
the accountability mechanism. 
One way to re-shape the perception of the role of IIs in order 
to enable a truly robust accountability framework is by assessing 
the capacity of any international actor to exercise public authority 
in the liberal sense. The liberal understanding of public authority 
as formulated by Bogdandy et al. is determined by assessing the 
constitutive and limiting functions of institution actions [3]. While 
the constitutive function assures that the act in question is truly public 
in nature, the limiting function “helps to translate concerns about 
legitimacy of governance into meaningful arguments of legality”. From 
this perspective, though it is an undeniable reality that in comparison 
to domestic level, governance at the global level can generally be 
characterised as relatively less inherently cohesive, the consequential 
cohesiveness of IIs actions and decisions especially those that issue 
“soft laws” should not be ignored. 
This liberal interpretation of what it means for an institution 
to exercise public authority has to contend with the prevailing 
understanding regarding the nature of public authority. It must 
however be stated that there has been a shift in perception primarily 
because of the surge of globalisation such that no serious minded 
stakeholder would totally discount the role of accountability at the 
international level. Improvements notwithstanding, the imperativeness 
of the scrutiny is not seen as absolute necessity because of the lingering 
perception that most IIs cannot be said to exercise public authority. 
This perhaps explains why more focus has been given to procedural 
accountability and not substantive accountability. From this classical 
perspective, an even deeper level of disregard is given to IIs are tend to 
govern indirectly. The foregoing consequences would easily follow from 
a tacit assertion that the absence of authority on the part of IIs renders 
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baseless any attempt to hold IIs accountability for their substantive 
actions. In essence, IIs would be seen as holding no institutional 
responsibility [7], and would at best be superficially considered to be 
individually accountable.
Before exploring further the liberal perspective on the exercise of 
public authority, it should be noted that there has indeed been efforts 
by some scholars to formulate frameworks that hold IIs responsible 
and accountable in their own right. The appeal of such accounts 
were however compromised by the fact that they were effectively 
subordinated to states responsibility. For example, D’Aspremont stated 
in this regard that the measure of accountability required of IIs in any 
given situation should be similar to the threshold to which a state would 
have been held if it was the latter that was implication in the given 
situation [8]. This in some sense makes it possible for IIs and states to 
sides-step legal responsibilities by taking advantage of the inflexibility 
of legal concepts through which responsibility and accountability are 
determined. 
Conclusively, while the problem associated with the limited 
focus of the accountability frameworks for IIs has been established. 
The proposition for the establishment of substantive accountability 
mechanisms would be sustainable only after, first showcasing 
institutional actions as either inherently or consequentially cohesive, 
and secondly, imbuing authority into such cohesive actions. It is not 
until these conceptual issues are settled before an effort can be made to 
elucidate a concrete account of substantive accountability. 
Re-orientating the Public Law Perspective to Institu-
tional Governance
It is pertinent at this juncture to highlight the nature of substantive 
accountability which this paper seeks to stress. Addressed from a 
public law point of view, the issue of accountability is firmly related to 
the concept of rule of law [9] and it is built on the understanding that 
“any exercise of public power outside a limiting framework of public 
law is reason for concern [10].” 
The concerns often raised in terms of accountability can be 
reduced to three broad questions; who is accountable, to whom one 
is accountable, and for what is one held accountable. In the context 
of international institutional law, the first two issues are largely 
procedural. As already noted, the need for procedural accountability 
cannot be overemphasised. Indeed, the importance of procedural 
accountability was stated by von Bernstorff who observed the 
“growing uneasiness about the way public power is exercised beyond 
the national realm.” Due to the concerns echoed by stakeholders of 
different inclinations, efforts have been made by institutions to set up 
an acceptable procedural framework. 
The accountability mechanisms built into these systems have 
been designated to different levels. The first level, it has been said, 
encompasses a range of possibly non-judicial procedures aimed at 
scrutinising IIs’ behaviour. Such broad mechanism can take retroactive 
or prospective forms [4]. However, the response to these arcane 
procedural concerns is often dependent on the institutional design and 
structure at the international level. The reality of international relations 
reveals the strong role of politics in this area [11] and therefore calls 
to question the value of any juridical attempt to build a principled 
framework of procedural scrutiny [12]. This means that the issue of 
accountability as an integral component of international rule of law 
would hardly be taken seriously. 
As would be detailed below, one of the reasons behind the failure 
to recognise the implicit authority in certain actions of IIs stems from 
oversights that occur when International Relations (IR) interacts with 
the law. As a result of this interaction, rule of law and accountability 
discourse in the public law sense have thus stagnated and continue to 
be treated as broad issues of principle. This stems from the inability of 
legal scholars to reconcile the multidimensional character of IIs “with 
the largely ‘one-dimensional’ areas of international law” [13]. Another 
factor is that the relative supremacy of domestic law has led many 
scholars to characterise and review international activities through the 
well establish rule of law paradigm at the domestic level.
There is little doubt that international law has benefitted immensely 
from IR ideologies. The latter have helped to infuse “reality” into the 
doctrinal nature of law. However, somewhere along the line of this 
valued interdisciplinary interaction, the direction of legal analysis 
of IIs was gradually subsumed into IR’s sphere of inquiry. A clear 
manifestation of this altered direction is that even legal discourse at 
the international sphere tends to be centred on issues pertaining to 
influence (for instance the role of network governance and power 
relations) as against the more legal task such as the theory and practice 
of international legal authority and the constraining of such authority. 
Moreover, even where pure legal questions pertaining to authority 
and accountability are addressed, as shown with the GAR example, 
they are likely to be addressed within the narrow prism of procedural 
accountability. In such instance, the perception of accountability may 
be far from its reality as there is the tendency that the actual scrutiny 
might be merely formalistic with representative of IIs merely rubber-
stamping the acts of its departments and technical committees [10].
In order to refocus legal discourse on IIs, it has become imperative 
to give a reasoned legal response to the rule of law inquiry regarding the 
characteristics of actions requiring accountability. 
If we are to stand any chance of responding appropriately to the 
query concerning actions requiring scrutiny, one must be ready to think 
differently about IIs’ autonomy and the way they exercise authority. 
Indeed, as it will be shown below, it is the failure to firmly decipher IIs 
autonomy and the nature and scope of their authority that weakened 
the impetus of international law scholars to conceive of genuine 
accountability structure for international institutional governance in 
the public law sense.
Thus, in turn, the concepts of autonomy and authority will be 
addressed in detail. The aim is to distil the IR influence on the terms 
and how it has impacted upon legal scholars’ perception of the true 
nature of institutional actions and the public law function.
Autonomy
The proposed accountability mechanism would have the potential 
to tackle much of the overlooked activities of IIs only if we reassess 
what makes an institution autonomous. The impetus to hold IIs 
accountable is likely to be greatly diminished where IIs are seen 
as mere subordinates – tools in the hands of state actors. A typical 
position about the subordinated role of IIs within a larger social order 
is expressed by Chimni [14]. Though the agential role of IIs in many 
instances cannot be denied, such perspective only partly explains the 
nature of global governance. Moreover, failure to note IIs autonomy 
at both policy and decision-making level would unwittingly condition 
us to pay scant attention to aspects that already appear insignificant. 
Such oversight could indeed lead to the exclusion of far-reaching 
institutional decisions from legal scrutiny [15].
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Some scholars have asserted the autonomous role of IIs especially 
as against the perception that they are subordinated to states [6]. It 
has thus been contended that even though international institutions 
may be a product of states, they do act autonomously. This observation 
has warranted the need to “divert attention away from the rear-view 
mirror directed at (International Institution’s) embryonic stages under 
the tutelage of (dominant) constituent members [as International 
Institutions] have grown up.” In other words, “apart from (being) 
instruments in the hands of one or a number of powerful actors or 
arenas for decision-making, (institutions) can also be autonomous 
actors exercising public authority in a broader governance process.” It 
has thus been noted that rather than focusing strictly on a state-centric 
approach to analysing global governance concerns, we should also pay 
attention to the perimeter of these institutions’ “actions, the sources of 
their autonomy and to how they act.”
Question on autonomy of IIs has been motivated by different ends, 
the most notable of them being the conception of autonomy as political 
independence. This concept has been considered an integral issue in 
substantiating the legal personality of IIs [13]. Some of the notable 
debates in this regard have been between the neo-sovereigntism and the 
legal cosmopolitanism schools of thought [16]. Legal cosmopolitanism 
scholars argue in favour of the idea of institutional autonomy as it is 
believed that this conception helps to give a more robust picture of 
international law in that it, amongst other things, would help to foster 
corporation and remove global power asymmetry. There is indeed 
some level of coherence between the idea of legal cosmopolitanism 
and the underlying ethos of this paper. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the claim of autonomy herein proposed is motivated by a much 
narrower goal – to enhance the accountability of IIs in the public law 
sense. In essence therefore, it is expected that at the very least, credible 
analysis of institutional autonomy will strengthen the case for holding 
IIs legally responsible [17]. 
It is essential to avoid misconstruing the idea of autonomy 
herein sought with an idea of autonomy that practically justifies the 
independence and total non-interference with the activities of IIs. 
As such, even where the idea of autonomy does not relate directly to 
accountability, it should set the stage for a worthy discussion of an II’s 
responsibility. For example, even where autonomy is addressed chiefly 
to situate the legal personality of an institution, the finding in this regard 
will go a long way in fashioning the appropriate way of scrutinising the 
institution in question. In essence therefore, no reasonable discourse 
on accountability can take place outside an appropriate conception of 
IIs’ autonomy. 
The view of IIs both as independent actors and as agents has 
meant that the issue of their autonomy has been interpreted differently 
depending on the end pursued. In both real terms and conceptually, 
some aspects of IIs are less amenable to the concept of autonomy than 
others. This has made it difficult to develop a constructive legal case 
for public law scrutiny at the international stage even though the value 
of public law analysis (at domestic level) has long been established. 
However, the failure to develop an adequate legal norm in this regard 
cannot be blamed on lack of effort. Attempts have been made to 
develop a respectable conceptual foundation for the idea of autonomy 
that will be adaptable to the pursuit of critical public law discourse. 
A notable attempt is that of D’Aspremont who sought to isolate the 
idea of autonomy necessary to support legal analysis. In this regard, 
he sought to differentiate between autonomy as political independence 
and autonomy as institutional independence [18]. However, despite 
his best effort, he conceded that the divide between the two subgroups 
might be artificial [13]. 
Issues concerning legal responsibility of IIs have often been nested 
on the conception of autonomy in the political sense. According to 
different strands of IR theories, IIs gain their autonomy either as a result 
of state’s inability to agree, or due to the professionalism and technical 
competence of the actors within those institutions. For instance, it is 
argued that even where the source of authority of IIs originate from 
their principal which are often state actors [19], IIs can nevertheless be 
said to be autonomous where their actions cannot be reduced to the 
interests of their so-called principal [6].
A principal could delegate legislative, implementation and 
enforcement functions to IIs. Where these three functions are 
delegated, there is little doubt that the institution in question is likely 
to act autonomously which would strengthen the case to hold them 
specifically accountable by characterising their actions and inactions 
as constituting acts of public authority. If the legislative authority is 
delegated without an overriding competence by the principal, the level 
of autonomy is limited but still likely to be strong enough to amount to 
an exercise of public authority. 
However, where the competence transferred to the international 
institution merely enables the institution to administer norms fully 
negotiated between members, one would have to assess the level of 
autonomy afforded by such delegation before a firm statement can be 
made as to whether the institution’s actions falls within the scope of 
public authority. This ultimately will be determined by the amount of 
discretion which the norm allows.
One way in which autonomy of institutions has been conceived 
from the political science perspective is by conceptualising IIs as 
“international bureaucracies” [6]. Though this idea is attractive in 
that it reinforces IIs autonomy to develop strategies of their own. 
Nevertheless, its potential elitist implication would also weaken the 
claim for substantive accountability at best; this ideology would 
support the establishment of due process as it might be perceived 
that appropriate substantive scrutiny cannot be done on technical 
issues from the outside. The relative absence of substantive scrutiny 
in institutions such as the World Bank and IMF reflect these concerns 
[20]. 
The appropriate idea of autonomy has to fit into the concept of rule 
of law. Though the importance of the rule of law and accountability at 
international level has been recognised, the concept is yet to gain much 
traction in comparison to the domestic setting. The effect is that since 
IIs are autonomous and at the same time not autonomous, they should 
be able to act without constraints and independently. However, they 
must also be subject to the checks of those from whom they derived 
their authority. At the same time, those exercising the checks should 
not as much as confine the activities of IIs. Thus, when it comes to the 
overall accountability of IIs mechanisms, one should probably hold 
member states responsible for the actions of IIs because the former 
are the source of the latter’s authority [21] but at the same time, the 
bureaucratic nature of IIs mean that they should be held accountable 
in their own right. The characterisation of IIs’ autonomy in this regard 
therefore creates a complex cyclical web indeed. Little wonder therefore 
that there has been not much success in substantiating the appropriate 
scope and content of accountability for IIs. 
The idea of autonomy that would be suitable for this paper is 
such that would enable scrutiny of the substantive acts and inactions 
of IIs in a rule of law context. The true implication of this apparently 
terse statement would become visible after a thorough analysis of IIs 
authority is addressed. 
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Authority
Indeed, holding an institution accountable for its substantive 
actions cannot be a limitless exercise. The scope of such institution’s 
responsibility should ordinarily align with the authority it exercises. 
Even where an institution is found to be autonomous, it does not 
automatically means that all of its actions constitute an exercise of 
authority. It is thus evident that to decipher the substantive actions 
for which IIs should be held accountable and how they should be held 
accountable, one must first concretely address the institution’s exercise 
of authority.
Questions on IIs’ authority are topical. Increasingly, scholars are 
asking what it means for IIs to have authority [22]. Reasons for this 
query are divergent most of which will not be explored further in this 
paper. The term authority has no fixed definition. However, the term 
elicits discourse that draws on its relationship with other terms such as 
power and persuasion. What makes this discourse unavoidably topical 
is that authority seems to imply a degree of cohesion and persuasion by 
the institution as well as consent and voluntary recognition by subjects. 
At the same time, none of these attributes will suffice to establish 
authority in their own right. In this regard therefore, Hannah Arendt 
rightly noted that authority must be understood “in contradistinction 
to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments [23].” 
Venzke also notes that “[w]hat arguably characterizes authority 
in contrast to power is a moment of consent, or a certain degree of 
voluntary recognition. At the same time, authority implies influence 
also in the absence of agreement by the addressee. If tested, authority 
needs to withstand disagreement and is thus different from persuasion 
[22].” The seeming puzzle emanating from this discourse therefore 
provokes questions as to how it is possible that authority rests on 
voluntary recognition and still constrains.
It appears to be taken for granted that aspect of an II’s activity which 
constitutes an exercise of authority can be deciphered by simply looking 
at the form in which the action is expressed. This could take place in 
the context of law making, interpretation or implementation. Where 
the form of expression is conveyed through so-called hard laws such 
as treaties or if their implementation is undertaken through a global 
authority with relatively functional administrative capacity such as the 
WTO, it is taken for granted that such institution in such instances can 
be said to exercise authority which has been ceded to them by states 
[24]. However, where the actions of IIs are conveyed through so-called 
soft laws such as guidelines and recommendations, there has been less 
enthusiasm as to their impact. This boils down from the understanding 
that soft law are “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally 
binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects [25].” 
In this regard therefore, some have for instance contended that “[s]
tatements of general aim and broad declarations of principle are 
[examples of which are soft laws]… too indefinite to create enforceable 
obligations and therefore agreements which do not go beyond that 
should be presumed to be non-binding”. The impression this creates 
therefore is that the seemingly “soft” law preserves state sovereignty 
than hard law [26]. While such distinction might prove to be correct 
in some cases, it appears rather too simplistic and unprincipled and as 
such could give a false interpretation of an international institution’s 
action. This could consequently impact on the scope of the public law 
scrutiny. 
Some transnational legal scholars dare to think differently. 
According to Cotterrell, this group of scholars understand that there a 
space between that domestic governance and international governance 
that requires some form of regulation [27]. More importantly, 
transnational legal reasoning can help to disabuse the regimented 
approach to ascertaining authority such that one looks less at the form 
and more at the effect of the institution’s actions. This however does 
not mean that transnational legal reasoning can disregard the dividing 
line between acts that amount to authority as against actions that are 
a manifestation of power as well as persuasive actions. Rather, the 
flexibility afforded by this line of reasoning renders the need to firmly 
establish the dividing line. 
That an institution’s legislative actions are widely followed 
regardless of the form in which they are expressed does not mean 
that such actions reflect public authority. Indeed it will be improper 
to conceive authority in this way. If one follows an uncritical path in 
assessing the effect of an institution’s legislative activities, we might 
fail to differentiate the effect nested on obedience and that based on 
substantive agreement. It means therefore that even though there is 
need to divert the focus from institutional actions to the effect of their 
action, it remains imperative that an act is only considered to constitute 
an exercise of authority where it commands obedience even in the 
absence of agreement in substance [22]. The dilemma here is summed 
up in the observation that “[c]onstraint in the absence of consent spells 
power instead of authority and at the same time there would be no 
authority if it not also persisted in the absence of agreement [28].”
However, when assessed through what is herein termed the “effect 
perspective”, institutional actions expressed in seeming subtle form 
can possibly be incorporated within the category of activities capable 
of constituting an exercise of authority though it must be noted that 
adopting this perspective makes it ever more important and even more 
difficult to differentiate authority from persuasion. In this regard, it 
has been noted that “authority implies that the addressee acts as if she 
took the contents of the command as a maxim for action due to the 
relationship of authority and not because of her own assessment of the 
command as such [22].” It means therefore that in assessing the effect, 
focus need be placed on the intent of the party exercising authority 
not on compliance based on a subject’s perception of the nature of 
the command. In other words “[a]uthority implies at least relative 
content-independence; that is, its demand for obedience cannot only 
turn on the persuasiveness of its content in the eyes of the addressee.” 
Nevertheless, consent of the addressee is important as it helps to 
differentiate authority from mere exercise of power.
In the context of international economic law for example, many 
activities of IEIs take the form of soft measures. This makes any attempt 
to decipher the intent of these institutions perilous at best – do they 
intend that their “proposed” measure be applied by subjects even 
where the latter disagrees or do they merely seek to make the measures 
as acceptable as possible in order to persuade subjects to comply? A 
curious example is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-
governmental body which makes ‘recommendations’ for combating 
money laundering and terrorism financing. 
Effort has been made to solve this conundrum by substantiating 
a principled account of what it means to say that an institution has 
or exercises authority. For example, because of its reflexive nature, 
it has been suggested that authority should be seen as arising from 
a discursive practice forming just a part of a broader constellation 
[29]. Determining whether an act constitutes an exercise of authority 
by focusing on the expected consequence of such act rather than the 
nature of the act itself will help to solve the consent/restraint debacle 
[30].
Citation: Al-Ameen A (2016) International Economic Institutions: Developing the Concept of Substantive Accountability. J Civil Legal Sci 5: 173. 
doi:0.4172/2169-0170.1000173
Page 6 of 10
Volume 5 • Issue 2 • 1000173J Civil Legal Sci
ISSN: 2169-0170 JCLS, an open access journal
Mere influence can transform to authority as a result of the 
political process or as a result of de facto legal state. With regards to the 
former, it can be said that by engendering a common belief of what is 
acceptable, it can be argued that norms serve as the basis of authority 
as their accustomed use and reiteration of particular behaviour create 
an expectation that actions based on these norms will be followed [31]. 
Thus according to international relations scholars, the persistence of 
such norms have the effect of conditioning compliance at the domestic 
level and in turn, these customs reinforce compliance. 
As noted above, institutional actions can also transform into 
authority as a result of the de facto consequence of such action. To be 
able to perceive authority in this sense, it is imperative to focus on the 
actual consequence of the action as opposed to assessing the nature of 
the action (i.e., hard or soft) or considering the process of legalisation 
(i.e., norm creation). In essence, in line with this reasoning, there is 
a possibility that an action, regardless of its nature or the process of 
legalisation can be said to constitute an exercise of authority. It is 
however essential to recognise that it is by no means an ‘ends justify 
the means’ proposition as conditions would have to be established 
to streamline the boundaries of what we term to be an exercise of 
authority as against ends based on ‘rough consensus’, ‘persuasive 
appeal’, or ‘mutual agreements’. Bogdandy et al. were at pains to stress 
the need to develop an appropriate concept of public authority since 
it is “[o]nly authoritative acts [that are required] to be constituted and 
limited by public law, and the limiting function of public law depends 
on identifiable actors on whom to impose limitations [32].” According 
to this school, the form which a measure takes could possibly be of no 
tangible consequence. It is thus noted by Erika de Wet who stated that 
“[d]ecisive is not whether the normative act is legally binding in the 
formal sense, but rather whether it has a de facto impact on the rights 
and interests of States and/or non-State actors” [4].
Once this assertion is established, it becomes elementary to say that 
the activities of such institutions could spring up legitimacy concerns. 
Their legitimacy can only be settled if there is appropriate mechanism 
that renders them accountable; the gap between their exercise of 
authority and the absence of appropriate scrutiny would need to be 
reined in through the formulation of appropriate legal question which 
would ultimately provide the foundation for the clamour of substantive 
accountability.
Moreover, the increasingly changing architecture of global 
governance has rendered rather mooted the viability of assessing the 
process through which institutions act. This is because, as noted by 
Calliess and Zumbansen, norms created by institutions in recent times 
seem to oscillate between “the so-called official, ‘hard’ law and unofficial, 
‘soft law’” [29]. This concern has thus set scholars on the task of aligning 
the new set of norms with the existing norms. In the traditional 
sense, hard law with firm enforcement mechanisms would except in 
exceptional cases allude to the presence of institutional authority. On 
the assumption that one can take for granted the authority embedded 
in hard law, and more importantly because most institutional designs 
concerning economic issues tend to operate through ‘soft’ measures, 
the remainder of this part will focus on soft law. The aim will be to 
ascertain how seemingly soft laws can be incorporated in the existing 
account of authority. 
Substantive Accountability-its Contents
Substantive rules create social reality and IIs have a role to play 
in this process through the creation of “meanings, classification and 
norm-diffusion” [33]. Hence to ensure that such substantive rules 
are well construed and implemented, there is a dire need to provide 
platforms for scrutinising them. However, traditionally, discussions 
about an organisation’s accountability are often addressed through 
an assessment of its structure and procedural framework. In this 
sense therefore, any general assertion about accountability deficit in 
institutional practice would more likely be understood to mean that 
such institution does not have an appropriate democratic framework 
in place or that the institution fails to follow due process. Sometimes, 
questions might be raised about the veracity or appropriateness of 
applying certain norms that are generated by the institution in question. 
For example, a non-member might review the applicability of certain 
OECD guidelines within its jurisdiction. Review in this regard is rarely 
directed at the content of the guidelines. Rather, it is more common 
that approvals or discontentment’s are expressed based on factors such 
as their perception of how representative such guidelines are. 
Limiting the accountability exercise to procedural issues might in 
many cases be truly sufficient. However, undue focus on procedural 
“rightness” or “wrongness” could be at the cost of thorough 
accountability. Failure to recognise the exercise of authority inherent 
in institutional acts would give the erroneous impression that it is 
unnecessary to conduct a public law review of institutional goals and 
the appropriateness of the medium employed to achieve such goal. 
Rather, it is contended that more attention should be placed on the 
political concerns associated with questions such as how the goal was 
reached or how the medium was decided.
Implicit in the expositions made thus far in this paper is the value 
of scrutinising the content of institutional measures. For substantive 
accountability, it is thus expected that in additional to reviewing the 
procedures through which an institution reaches decisions, it is equally 
important to review the philosophies, content, and implications of such 
decision. A good example is to assess the goals sought and the medium 
for achieving such goals. This form of scrutiny however raises two major 
concerns – through what yardstick should such act be measured? Is it 
appropriate to scrutinise the substantive contents of soft institutional 
measures? It is conceded that there is hardly a value-neutral metric 
for assessing the propriety or otherwise of institutional acts. Thus, 
one runs the risk of substituting the desired public law scrutiny with 
the idiosyncratic views of the assessors. In the same vein, the fact that 
recipients of the soft measures could in principle exercise discretion as 
to whether or not to adopt a soft measure brings to question the need 
for a firmer scrutiny. These two concerns will be treated in turn.
Substantive accountability of “hard” measures-deciphering 
the yardstick
This paper thus far has emphasised the dearth of accountability 
mechanisms for assessing the substantive content of institutional 
practices. This assertion at this juncture however requires some 
qualification. It would be incorrect to assert that IIs have been left to 
ride roughshod at the international stage. Indeed, such inference will be 
far from the truth as it has been consistently affirmed that IIs are often 
subjected to procedural scrutiny. Moreover, it would also be erroneous 
to suggest that transnational law is bereft of any form of mechanism to 
scrutinise the substantive contents of IIs’ practices. Through common 
constitutional and public law mechanisms such as judicial review [34], 
efforts have been made to hold IIs accountable for their substantive 
actions. It has thus been rightly observed that IIs “are no longer 
regarded as merely convenient vehicles of inter-state cooperation. 
Rather, they are perceived as powerful actors whose actions/acts need 
to be restrained by the rule of law [35].” 
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While many would consider the direct review of institutional acts 
to be few and far between, it has been contended by some that the rate 
at which the acts of IIs are subjected to judicial review is more than 
it ordinarily appears especially if one pays attention to the various 
indirect forms of judicial review [36]. The present scope of substantive 
scrutiny should however not be overstated given that there is no 
established principled way of engaging in such exercise. Moreover, 
the identified instances where IIs activities were scrutinised through 
judicial review seem to be in those cases where the measures in question 
had some relatively obvious elements of coerciveness. Measures that 
are considered “soft” are however not scrutinised at the same level. 
In order to substantiate a holistic and principled account of 
substantive accountability, it is necessary to gain an understanding of 
how judicial review can be deployed in holding IIs accountable. 
In the transnational context, institutional acts that involve some 
degree of exercise of public authority may be subjected to judicial 
scrutiny at both the domestic and regional level [4]. This in some way 
could be viewed as one of the means through which national courts 
check the practices of IIs in a decentralised system of transnational 
governance [37]. Such judicial review may in fact be desirable as it may 
indeed be a viable route for holding IIs accountable for their substantive 
actions. This avenue remains suitable regardless of the concerns one 
might have as to the potential effect such decentralised scrutiny might 
have on the autonomy of IIs [38]. However, this is not to say that such 
concerns that have implication for the independence and autonomy 
of IIs are without base. Admittedly, this present line of reasoning may 
raise query as to why there appears to be a sudden change in position 
on the issue of IIs autonomy. In response to such query, it must be 
noted first of all that the idea of IIs autonomy is not an end in itself. The 
emphasis on IIs’ autonomy is not made to support the idea that they 
are severable or that such institution can be shielded from the remit of 
transnational governance through concepts such as immunity. Rather, 
the idea of IIs’ autonomy herein emphasised is a means for affirming 
the identity of the actor with whom responsibility lies. 
Despite the desirability of a decentralised judicial review system, 
concerns arise regarding how the yardstick for measuring institutional 
acts should be determined. The danger here is that where national 
courts follow their own idiosyncratic idea of “the good” such promising 
public law platform may be reduced to IR squabbles between states 
and non-state actors. Moreover, where the yardsticks are subjective, 
the concerns regarding the effect of national judicial review on the 
autonomy of IIs may become potently real. 
The question as to the appropriate yardstick for questioning acts 
of IIs have been raised by Reinisch who wondered whether it should 
be based on domestic law in general or based on core national law 
protections (such as fundamental rights), or even international 
law [35]. In response, Reinisch, motivated by the urge to avoid 
undermining the autonomy of IIs, considers that such judicial review 
should be conducted through the yardstick of human rights nested on 
internationally accepted principles as opposed to those that are based 
purely on national legal concepts. Further, Benvenisti and Downs are 
of the opinion that coordination between national courts in this regard 
will have substantial global benefits [36].
The extent to which national courts are willing or able to hold IIs 
accountable is equally worthy of note. It is imperative to ascertain 
how courts react when asked to review acts of IIs – are they willing or 
reluctant to do so? When they show willingness, how do they justify the 
exercise of such judicial review? Should they be more willing or should 
they refrain from scrutinising IIs? 
The Solange I case [39] could provide some insight in answering 
some of the questions raised above as this case seems to suggest 
that there could be a valid basis for adopting a decentralised judicial 
review mechanism in scrutinising the actions of IIs especially when 
fundamental values are at stake. In this case, the German Constitutional 
Court did not shy away from reviewing the actions of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). The Court applied its national laws 
which it justified on the grounds that the protection afforded by the 
EEC was inadequate. This case seems to serve as the template for other 
national courts whenever they are faced with the task of reviewing the 
activities of IIs [35]. However, another way to interpret the reasoning 
in this case is that courts would be more likely to exercise restraint if the 
institution in question has an alternative review mechanism vice versa. 
The line of interpretation in Solange 1 however leaves open 
two legal quandaries as far as IIs’ scrutiny is concerned. First, the 
fact that the Solange approach “demonstrates that the need for the 
implicit decentralized judicial review by national courts may be most 
pertinent where the protection of core fundamental values is pursued” 
implicitly “introduces value judgments which may be difficult to make 
and accept.” Second, there is the danger that an II might altogether 
escape being held accountable for its substantive actions where the 
national courts readily refrain from conducting judicial review because 
such institution has an alternative judicial or quasi-judicial review 
mechanism. Here, the concern is that an institution might appear to 
have a review mechanism which might not be transparent or might 
even be ineffective. 
One way of side-stepping the challenges associated with the review 
of IIs is for courts to undertake a “low intensity” review [40]. It has been 
noted that this approach makes judicial intrusion more acceptable as 
it “lies often in a reduced level of scrutiny, for example where courts 
check only whether the rights and values forming the standard of 
review are generally complied with and not whether this was the case 
in the specific situation [35].” The concern with this approach however 
is that the judicial review might turn into a toothless exercise as courts 
might in the exercise of excessive caution be inclined to interpreting 
such acts as conforming to human rights principles.
Substantive accountability in soft cases
As it has been continuously iterated throughout this paper, there 
is need to take seriously the soft law mechanism employed by IEIs. 
With regards to the task of developing a substantive accountability 
framework, it is thus necessary to expound on the possibility of extending 
the judicial review mechanism adopted in cases involving hard law to 
instances where IIs’ actions are under scrutiny. This transition is vital as 
governance has evolved. More and more, institutional actions take the 
shape of permissive rules [41] that allows for flexibility and discretion 
where necessary. Moreover, as already revealed through the “effect 
perspective” of the concept of public authority, seemingly permissive 
actions could in fact have authoritative force. Indeed, it could be as 
coercive as hard measures, thus warranting an appropriate level of 
scrutiny. It is because of such instances that it becomes imperative to 
extend the judicial scrutiny of IIs to instances where their practices are 
considered to be ‘soft’. 
Nevertheless, one is not expected to take such quantum leap on 
the back of the conjecture that soft measures may also require deeper 
scrutiny. Its imperativeness has to be thoroughly established. In light 
of the IPA, it has been contended that soft measures may in fact have 
coercive effect through their constraint on individuals. According to 
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this account, the source of authority of such soft mechanism lies in the 
actual effect such measures have. 
As a rule of thumb, it would appear that those to whom soft laws 
are directed often retain the discretion to follow or disregard such 
laws. If such assertion is shown to be true, it would put to question the 
supposed authoritative effect which one might have been inclined to 
attribute to soft measures. Take for example the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE Guidelines) which despite its 
widespread appeal leaves states with the discretion of either adhering 
or not adhering with its contents without any direct institutionalised 
negative repercussion. 
It is however contended that the fact that guidelines may not be 
adhered to does not make them any less law and as such does not 
necessarily rob off the cohesive elements in them. So long as there is 
a cost for non-compliance, the scope for viewing such seeming soft 
measure as constituting an authoritative act remains open. One can 
draw parallel to areas in which exercise of authority is beyond dispute. 
A local authority might designate an area as a ‘no parking’ zone with 
non-adherents liable to pay steep fine. Despite the clear authoritative 
character of such law, subjects might choose whether or not to abide by 
the law. Indeed, someone might continuously act against the stated law 
and quite happily pay the penalty. This functional law and economics 
reasoning has been used to explain international law, particularly the 
propensity for stakeholders to assess the compliance with international 
law in any particular instance would be efficient [42]. In such cases, 
even if issues might be raised as regards the effectiveness of the measure, 
this does not necessarily put in doubt the authoritative nature of such 
measure. 
In the same vein therefore, we would be wrong to deem for example 
the OECD Guidelines as lacking in authority just because there are 
non-adherents. It must however be equally conceded that there is 
no telling signs of cohesiveness in the OECD Guidelines itself either. 
Moreover, the parking ticket analogy is not quite apt as the OECD 
does not even exert punishment for non-adherence. However, given 
that the authoritativeness of soft measures may only be ascertained at 
the instance of breach, there is no apparent reason why the signal of 
its authoritativeness should emanate from the institution itself so long 
as there is an identifiable source that can potently threaten to punish 
non-adherents. 
The task of proving the existence of such punitive mechanism 
(wherever it may arise from) is crucial for streamlining those soft laws 
that could be said to be authoritative and hence justify the extension 
of judicial review exercise. To achieve this, focus will be placed on the 
OECD MNE Guidelines.
OECD MNE guidelines 
The popularity of the OECD MNE Guidelines as a business code of 
global appeal is reflected in the assertion that it is “the only multilaterally 
endorsed and comprehensive code that governments are committed to 
promoting [43].” Some have even gone as far as describing them as 
“the principal intergovernmentally agreed ‘soft law’ tool of corporate 
accountability [44].” It has been noted that the appeal of the guidelines 
derives from the political commitment of OECD members and 
adherent non-members and not due to any form of legal force. 
The guidelines serve as a mere proposition which may be applied 
or dispensed with. This is even more so for non-adhering members. 
OECD members are however expected to comply since the guidelines 
exist in the first place primarily due to the stakeholders’ support. As 
such, as far as compliance of OECD members are concerned, it is 
imperative to assess critically whether there could exist or does exist 
an element of coercion in its institutional framework. Part of the 
roles required of the National Contact Points (NCPs) is to contribute 
to the resolution of “issues that arise relating to implementation 
of the Guidelines in specific instances in a manner that is impartial, 
predictable, equitable and compatible with the principles and standards 
of the Guidelines [45].” The document contains necessary procedure to 
be followed by the NCPs. It also emphasises that the NCPs will serve as 
mediators or conciliators in order to resolve any impasse arising from 
the implementation or non-implementation of the Guidelines. Even 
where disputing parties fail to reach an agreement, the NCPs can make 
recommendations on the implementation of the Guidelines. 
Notwithstanding the important role played by the NCPs in policing 
compliance with the Guidelines, it would be far-fetched to suggest that 
their activities amount to an enforcement mechanism. 
The foregoing observation should however not be seen as sealing 
the possibility of construing the Guidelines as authoritative. In line 
with the effect-based reasoning of the IPA as explained in the preceding 
parts of this paper, whether or not the Guidelines is considered 
authoritative would depend largely on our assessment on the actual 
effect the Guidelines have on subjects. It must be reiterated that in 
assessing this effect, the restriction on unilateral freedom (which is an 
essential requirement for the exercise of authority) need not emanate 
from the institution itself. On this basis therefore, it becomes imperative 
to conduct a more detailed analysis of the Guidelines.
The MNE Guidelines can be broadly categorised into two 
aspects in terms of the agenda it pursues – the trade and investment 
liberalisation agenda and the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
agenda. This paper will focus on the latter as the authoritative status 
of the former is in doubt. CSR has no fixed definition but it can be said 
to focus on maximising the societal contributions of businesses such 
as maintenance of respect for human rights, environmental protection 
or the pursuit of social justice. The MNE Guidelines’ pursuit of CSR 
goals is unequivocal. Paragraph 9 of the Preface to the Guidelines 
provides that “[t]he common aim of the governments adhering to the 
Guidelines is to encourage the positive contributions that multinational 
enterprises can make to economic, environmental and social progress 
and to minimise the difficulties to which their various operations may 
give rise.”
The widespread acceptance of the CSR agenda has led some to 
suggest that it should serve as the basis upon which minimum globally 
applicable standards for business should be built [46]. In this regard, 
it was noted by Ward that the CSR agenda is a potential candidate 
for shaping “the content of … a globally applicable minimum set of 
standards for business behaviour [46].” It has even been suggested 
that though the Guidelines are not legally binding, the fact that many 
countries have adopted them or modelled their contents give them 
moral force [47].
The foregoing shows the prime importance of the OECD MNE 
Guidelines in the global CSR architecture. However, given that the 
paper aims to justify the application of high threshold of scrutiny for 
such instruments, we cannot afford to proceed simply on the basis of 
The Guidelines’ general appeal. In other words, the Guidelines must be 
shown as truly authoritative.
It is quite clear that the OECD does not adopt any measure 
that directly or indirectly gives the Guidelines any coercive force. 
Notwithstanding, it can be contended that external factors have aided 
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in giving instruments such as the OECD MNE Guidelines authoritative 
force. The paramount factor is the stakeholder expectations [48] 
which might for various reasons impact on management approach 
of multinationals [49]. This could result from the perceived need to 
avoid the backlash for non-compliance [50]. Its authoritative nature is 
further strengthened by the array of specific complementary principles 
that have been established over the years for example in the field of 
human rights [51]. 
Conclusively therefore, the OECD MNE can support the contention 
that soft measures can indeed have authoritative force hence, in such 
instances, they should be scrutinised in the same way as hard law.
Judicial review of soft cases 
Given that it has been shown that seemingly soft measures can truly 
carry authoritative force and as such in some cases might be no less 
different from the institutional practices which have been shown to 
have been subjected to judicial reviewed by national courts, there is no 
reason why its substantive content should not be subjected to judicial 
review in the same way in which hard institutional measures have been 
scrutinised. 
Appropriate mode and degree of review
Up till this point, the paper has sought to establish the need to hold 
international institutions accountable for their substantive actions and 
in particular to broaden the scope of scrutiny to include seemingly 
innocuous “soft” measures through the adoption of “effect-perspective 
in defining the concept of public authority. In order to articulate the 
need for the herein proposed concept of substantive accountability, 
it was made a prerequisite that IIs are viewed as autonomous and 
authoritative actors. This remains so regardless of the form and mode 
of individual institutions [52]. De Wet noted in this regard that “it is 
the de facto impact of an international institution on the rights of States 
and/or non-State actors which triggers the accountability requirement, 
rather than the question whether the international institution 
constitutes a subject of international law in the formal sense [4].” 
However, once we proceed beyond the question of whether IIs 
should be held accountable and we are faced with the question of degree 
of scrutiny, one is then expected to take into account the peculiarities of 
each institution, we are to take into account the institutional structure 
and their operations. The peculiar characteristics of an institution may 
not be unconnected to the way in which they are established which 
might in turn give us a clue as to how they are likely to behave. It is 
basic reality that international institutions behave differently as a result 
of the differences in their forms and design which could result in wide 
ranging and disparate consequences. It would as such be uncritical and 
unhelpful to suggest a one-size-fits-all concept of legal scrutiny for all 
IIs. Moreover, the peculiarity of individual institution also makes it 
difficult to give a specific categorisation or concrete guidance on the 
appropriate mode and degree of review. Further, the perversity of the 
effect of IIs practices means that “the constituency entitled to claim 
accountability from an international institution can consist of a variety 
of international actors (with or without international legal personality), 
provided their interests or rights are affected by the conduct of the 
international institution in question.”
This means therefore that the degree of review should be 
determined in individual cases and even if it is considered necessary 
to set out ex ante guidance documents, it should at best contain open-
textured guidance based on broad categorisation of institutions.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to tease out and shed further light on the 
public law dimension of international institutions’ accountability 
deficit. In particular, the paper posits that the idea of substantive 
accountability is much less understood and pursued both within the 
institutions and by other stakeholders. Substantive accountability in 
this context is focused on the actual content of institutional acts as 
opposed to institutional forms and procedures. 
As regards the scope of activities requiring scrutiny, arguments 
were made to extend scrutiny to seeking soft measures of IIs. Given 
that there exists an uncontroverted difference in the nature of public 
authority exercised at the national as opposed to the international level, 
the absence of any direct punitive measure against non-adherents or 
violators of such soft provisions should not be seen as diminishing the 
claim of their authoritativeness so long as there exists an identifiable 
source willing to exercise such “punishment”. For instance, a 
transnational corporation may choose to exit a state for the latter’s 
failure to adhere to guidelines provided by an International Institution. 
The fact that such institution by itself is incapable of punishing such 
state becomes irrelevant. 
Conclusively therefore, it is suggested that we re-orientate 
ourselves to the issue of accountability of international institutions as 
these entities continue to play a more ingrained role in formulating 
and implementing policies that have direct impact of the social and 
economic welfare of global citizens. 
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